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In The Supreme Court 
of the State of Utah 
WILLIAM V. DAVIS, d/b/a 
DAVIS ELECTRIC COMPANY 
Plaintiff and Appellant, 
vs. 
STANLEY L. BARRETT and 
IRIS BARRETT, and PERC PETERSON, 
d/b/a TIMBERLAN SALES, 
Defendants and Respondents. 
Case No. 
11675 
Brief of Respondents 
Stanley L. Barrett and Jiris Barrett 
STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE 
This was an action brought by the Plaintiff to secure 
judgment for labor and materials claimed to have been 
.extras and furnished on a construction project and to fore-
close a materialman and labor lien against improved prop-
erty located in Salina, Utah. 
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DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT 
The lower court gr an t e d judgment to the Plaintiff 
against the Defendant Pere Peterson d/b/a Timberlan Sales 
Company for the sum of $1,861.15, plus inter1est to the date 
of judgment and attorney fees in the amount of $518.00, 
but denied any judgment against the Defendants Barrett 
and denied the validity of Plaintiff's Labor and Material-
man's Lien. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Defendants Stanley L. Barrett and Iris Barrett seek to 
have affirmed on appeal the judgment of the District Court. 
The Defendant Pere Peterson d/b/a Timberlan Sales, does 
not appeal from the judgment of the District Court and 
seeks no relief herein. 
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 
Defendants Stanley L. Barrett and Iris Barrett, hus-
band and wife, are the owners of real property in Salina, 
Utah. They entered into a contract with Pere Peterson, 
d/b/a Timblan Sales, for the construction of a supermarket 
upon the property. A contract for the construction was 
entered into on February 18, 1966. Pere P,eterson, among 
other things, agreed that the building would be constructed 
and also agreed: 
"***All wiring to be done by contractor inside of 
building'' 
(Defendants' Exhibit "D" 
Pere P.eterson, in turn, sub-contracted the .electrical 
wiring to the Plaintiff herein. (Defendants' Exhibit "A") 
The Plaintiff agr.eed, for a total of $6,000.00, to: 
"Complete electrical wiring as per plans and specs." 
Pere Peterson, the g,eneral contractor, had construction 
plans, but did not have prepared, or use at at any time, 
detailed specifications. (R. 93 L. 14; R. 95 L. 1 through 11) 
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The Plaintiff, claimed to have installed extras not in-
cluded in Ms contract and having a value of $1,851.15. Re 
alleges by his Complaint that an ·oral agreement. for the 
extras was entered into with Stanley L. Barrett, one of the 
owners of the proporty involved. 
Stanley L. Barrett has at all times maintained that he 
did not 0enter into any agreement with the Plaintiff for the 
alleged extras. He testified that at the time of conversa-
tions with Davis concerning the matter he said: 
"It would be up to Pere, because he was' on the contract, 
and my contract called for complete wiring.', . · " 
(R. 147 L. 12) 
The Plaintiff admits Barrett at no time acknowledged 
he would be responsible to pay the account (William Davis 
testimony R. 105 L. 26 through 28). 
Davis also submitted his first statement for the 
extras to Pere Peterson, general contractor. (R. 62 L. 26), 
A witness to part of the conversations between Stanley 
L. Barrett and the Plaintiff was Mr. Dick Scott .. He sup-
ported the testimony of Mr. Barrrett and that Mr. 
rett had stated he had bought a "turn job", and he 
didn't feel ·that he should have to pay for it ex. 
tras). (R. 131 L. 25 through 30) 
Stanley L. Barrett was informed by. Mr. Davis t h at 
Davis was going to file a lien against his property in the 
event the matter was not settled. Therefore, he took the 
pr,ecaution of not making any additional payments u n ti I 
the matter was settled and r,eceived a lien wai·ver from Mr. 
Davis, at which time he paid the sum of $2,800.00 from his 
funds. (See Defendants' Exhibit "C") 
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ARGUMENT 
THE COURT CORRECTLY FOUND NO CONTRACT 
EXISTED BETWEEN STANLEY L. BARRETT AND THE 
PLAINTIFF, WILLIAM L. DAVIS, AND CORRECTLY 
FOUND THE PLAINTIFF HAD NO LIEN AGAINST 
THE PROPERTY OF THE DEFENDANTS BARRETT. 
POINT I 
THE PREPONDERANCE OF THE EVIDENCE 
SHOWS THAT THE DEFENDANT BARRETT AT NO 
TIME ASSUMED THE ITEMS C L A I M E D BY THE 
PLAINTIFF WERE EXTRAS OR THAT HE WOULD PAY 
FOR THEM. 
POINT II 
THE PLAINTIFF EXECUTED A LIEN WAIVER AT 
THE COMPLETION OF HIS CONTRACT AFTER BEING 
INFORMED THAT NO PAYMENT WOULD BE MADE 
UNTIL THE ACCOUNT COULD BE SETTLED AND A 
WAIVER GIVEN. 
POINT I 
THE PREPONDERANCE OF THE EVIDENCE 
SHOWS THAT THE DEFENDANT BARRETT AT NO 
TIME ASSUMED THE ITEMS CLAIM E D BY THE 
PLAINTIFF WERE EXTRAS OR THAT HE WOULD PAY 
The Appellant does not contend the District Court 
erred in construing the law applying to the matter in con-
troversy. He contends there no evidence upon 
which to base the Findings of Fact and Judgment. Al-
though there are minor conflicts in the testimony of the 
parties, the clearly supports the judgment of 
Court; particularly when viewed under the rule of t 1 8 
Court that evidence on appeal will be viewed in the hght 
4 
most favorable to the party for whom judgment was enter-
ed. (Stanley -vs.- Grants 2 U2d 421, 276 P2d 489) 
The following Findings of Fact are now challenged, 
(R. 40) 
4. "That the materials and services performed by 
the Plaintiff at the r.equest of Pere Peterson d/b/a 
Timberlan Sales, have not been paid for and there is 
a balance due and owing in the amount of $1,861.-
15." 
5. "That the Plaintiff, William V. Davis, d/b/a 
Davis Electric Company, did on the 4th day of Octo-
ber, 1966, waive, release and surrender all rights he 
had or to which he may be entitled under and by 
virtue of mechanic's or materialmens' lien laws of 
the State of Utah. Said release was granted to Stan-
ley L. Barrett for good and valuable consideration 
and did fully release all claims and Ji.en rights that 
the said Plaintiff may have acquired against the 
Barr,ett Market property specifically described in 
Paragraph 2 above." 
We have treated this matter in considerable detail in 
the preceding statement of facts. We will attempt to avoid 
as much r.epetition as possible. 
T h e Finding of the District Court of no oral agree-
ment between Stanley L. Barrett and the Plaintiff appears 
to be overwhelmingly supported by the record. The Plain-
tiff, William L. Davis, at no time testified that Barrett 
agreed to pay for the alleged extras. The Plaintiff express-
ly admitted that he received no direct promise from Barrett. 
(R. 105 L. 24 through 28) 
The Plaintiff also testified that when he first billed out 
the alleged extras he sent the statement to the general con-
tractor, Pere Peterson. (R. 102 L. 18 through 28) 
One of the Plaintiff's witnesses, Dick Scott, was called 
and testified concerning the conversation between ,the Plain-
tiff Davis and the Defendant, Stanley L. Barrett. He said 
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the conv0ersation was in early July at the time equipment 
was being moved into the store. He stated that Barrett 
informed the Plaintiff Davis that he was not responsible 
for the additional items discussed by Davis and that he had 
bought a "turn key job" and he didn't feel that he should 
have to pay any extras. (R. 131 L. 7 through 30; R. 132 L . 
. 1 through 6) 
At the time of the conversation reported by Mr. Scott 
and upon which Mr. Davis relies as the foundation for his 
contract, no work was done in regard to the alleged extras 
for which the Plaintiff now claims reimbursement. The 
Plaintiff was put on notice at this .early date that Stanley 
L. Barr,ett w o u l d not assume any responsibility for pay-
. ment. This notice placed an obligation upon the Plaintiff 
to determine whether the work was included in his own con-
tract with Pere Peterson where he agreed to: 
"Complete electrical wiring as per plans and specs." 
(Defendant's Exhibit "A") 
Or, if it was an ,extra to be paid by the general contractor, 
Pere Peterson under his contract, which provided he would 
do: 
"All electrical wiring to be done by contractor inside 
building." (Defendant's Exhibit "D") 
The testimony of Stan1ey L. Barrett was positively that 
he at no time agreed to pay the Plaintiff for extras. Barrett 
at all times maintained that he informed Davis: 
"I don't know who is going to pay for it, but I am 
not." (R. 147 L. 8 - 9) 
Also Barrett testified that he told Davis: 
"It would be up to Pere, because he was on the con-
tract and my contract called for complete wiring." 
(R. 147 L. 12 - 13) 
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The r.ecord conclusively demonstrates that no witness, 
including the Plaintiff himself, heard the Defendant Stan-
ley L. Barrett say that he would pay for the alleged extras. 
We submit the District Court correctly found th at 
ther,e was no oral agrnement between Plaintiff, William L. 
Davis, and Defendant, Stanley L. Barrett. 
POINT II 
THE PLAINTIFF EXECUTED A LIEN WAIVER AT 
THE COMPLETION OF HIS CONTRACT AFTER BEING 
INFORMED THAT NO PAYMENT WOULD BE MADE 
UNTIL THE ACCOUNT COULD BE SETTLED AND A 
WAIVER GIVEN. 
The Plaintiff informed Def.endant Stanley L. Barrett 
that he was going to lien his place if he didn't straighten 
out the problem on the extras at the time the work was 
completed. (R. 78 L. 19 through 25; R. 148 L. 3 through 8) 
Barrett informed Davis that he would not pay anything 
on the account unless he cleared up the problem and signed 
a Waiver. (R. 48 L. 13 through 30). Davis at that time, 
informed Barrett he would not sign a Waiver and Barrett 
said, "All right, then I won't give you a check." 
(R. 149 L. 2) 
Later, Mr. Davis agreed to accept the check and sign 
a Lien Waiver. Mr. Barr,ett took the precaution of forward-
ing a Cashier's Check in the sum of $2,800.00 to a Brigham 
City Bank to be held in escrow until the waiver was receiv-
ed. (R. 81 L. 29 - 30; R. 82 L. 1 through 8; R. 149 L. 1 
through 15) 
Exhibit "C" is a copy of the Lien Waiver executed and 
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filed by the Plaintiff1 in order to receive from escrow the 
$2,800.00 Cashier's Check which was deposited ther.e. It 
was apparent that some attempt was made by the Plaintiff 
to mislead Defendant Stanley L. Barrett by the wording of 
the Release. However, the Release construed in the light of 
the conditions for the escrow and the requirement t h at 
Stanley L. Barrett pay the sum of $2,800.00 at the time of 
receiving the Waiver, would ,estop2 the Plaintiff from claim-
ing the Release meant nothing. 
The District Court did not permit the Plaintiff to deny 
the effect of the instrument and thereby permit a willful 
act to misl0ead the Bank or Defendant Barrett. 
We submit the District Court correctly found that any 
lien which might have been held by the Plaintiff D av is 
against the Barrett property was fully released. The Court 
did award the Plaintiff the full amount he was claiming, to-
g.ether with attorney fees and costs against the Defendant 
Pere Peterson, and did further make a provision to apply 
funds held from Pere Peterson by Defendant Stanley L. 
Barrett to that judgment. The Judgment of the Court 
appears to be highly favorabJ.e to the Plaintiff Davis under 
the circumstances. 
CONCLUSION 
We respectfully submit the judgment of the Tri a 1 
Court should be affirmed on appeal. The evidence amply 
1, 17 Am Jur 2d, Section 276. "It is fundamental that doubtful language 
in a contract should be interpreted most strongly against the party 
who selected the language, especially where he seeks to use. such 
language to defeat the contract or its operation ... " "Also, m the 
case of doubt or ambiguity a contract will be construed most strong· 
ly against the party who drew or prepared it, or whose attorney 
drew or prepared it." 
2. I. X. L. Stores Co. v. Success Markets. 98 Utah 160, 97 P 2d 577. 
The law upon the subject, equitable estoppel, is well settled. 
The vital principle is, that he who, by his language or conduct, !eat 
another to do what he would not otherwise have done, shall not 
ject such person to loss or injury by disapp<?inti!1g the 
upon which be acted. Such a change of position is sternly forbidden 
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supports the findings made and the circumstances under 
which the Lien Waiver was by the Plaintiff, Wil-
liam V. Davis, and delivered to the Defendant, Stanley L. 
Barrett, would fully and completely r.elease any lien rights 
he may have acquired in the Barrett property. 
Respectfully submitted, 
OLSEN AND CHAMBERLAIN 
By TEX R. OLSEN 
Attorney for Defendants 
Stanley L. Barrett and Iris Barrett. 
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